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COUNTING VOTES AND DISCOUNTING HOLDINGS IN THE 
SUPREME COURT'S TAKINGS CASES 
RICHARD J. LAzARus· 
The regulatory takings issue is notoriously muddled.! Dramat-
ically opposing views regarding the proper relationship between 
private property and government regulation consistently have 
polarized scholarly debate.2 The Supreme Court today seems no 
less splintered on the issue's proper resolution than it was when 
it first embarked down the regulatory takings path with Justice 
Holmes's opinion for the Court in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. 
Mahon,3 from which Justice Brandeis sharply dissented. The 
Court's regulatory takings decisions are among its most conten-
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University School of Law. This Essay is based 
on a presentation given April 11, 1996, at a Symposium on Defining Takings: Pri-
vate Property and the Future of Government Regulation sponsored by the William & 
Mary School of Law's Institute of Bill of Rights Law. I would like to thank Profes-
sor Lynda L. Butler for inviting me to participate in the Symposium and 
Georgetown University law students Andrea Blander and Andrew Schaefer for their 
research assistance in preparing this Essay. Finally, I served as counsel for govern-
mental entities in many of the Supreme Court regulatory takings cases discussed in 
this Essay. This Essay expresses my views alone and not necessarily those of my 
clients in any of those cases. 
1. See Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a 
Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 561 (1984). 
2. Compare, e.g., RICHARD A. EpSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIvATE PROPERTY AND THE 
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985) (arguing that the Eminent Domain Clause and 
parallel clauses in the Constitution render many reforms of the 20th century, such 
as zoning, constitutionally suspect), with Thomas C. Grey, The Malthusian Constitu-
tion, 41 U. MIAMI L. REv. 21 (1986) (criticizing Epstein's constitutionally based argu-
ment in Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain for rolling back 
the welfare state through traditional property rights); Mark Kelman, Taking Takings 
Seriously: An Essay for Centrists, 74 CAL. L. REv. 1829, 1830 (1986) <book review) 
(asserting that critical insights best expose Epstein's Takings "pretenses to analytical 
power"); and Joseph L. Sax, Takings, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 279, 292 (1986) <book re-
view) (stating that the legal and economic world are too complex for Epstein's "sim-
ple formal rules"). 
3. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
1099 
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tious. Many are decided by closely divided votes.4 Individual 
Justices seem to waver with regularity on the issues, prompting 
majorities in one case to become dissents in another, and vice 
versa, thereby further deepening the precedental confusion.5 
This Essay focuses on a dimension of the regulatory takings 
issue that has received relatively little attention in what is oth-
erwise a vast amount of literature on the topic: Why the Court 
is so persistently splintered and its precedent so seemingly 
schizophrenic. Most academic discussion has focused on the 
sheer difficulty of reconciling the public's firmly held conception 
of sacrosanct private property rights with the public's increasing 
'demand for restrictions on the exercise of those same rights 
when they affect others adversely.6 This Essay's thesis is that 
reasons for this phenomenon exist beyond those that have domi-
nated the ongoing academic discourse. These additional reasons 
are best revealed by piercing the popular fiction that the Court 
is a monolithic institution. The Court's decisions should instead 
be read keeping in mind the fact that the Court is simply nine 
individual Justices who speak through the voice of shifting coali-
tions of at least five Justices. 
4. See discussion infra Part I and note 9. 
5. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
6. See, e.g., JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIvATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (1990); Eric T. Freyfogle, The Owning and Taking of Sen-
sitive Lands, 43 UCLA L. REv. 77, 78 (1995); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, 
and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 
HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1224-45 (1967); Rose, supra note 1, at 594-97; Joseph L. Sax, 
Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971); see also Jed 
Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1096 (1993) (criticizing legal scholarship that 
focuses on "the irreconcilable conceptual demands made on the idea of private prop-
erty within our legal system" as "taking takings thinking too seriously"); Carol M. 
Rose, Property As the Keystone Right, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329 (1996). Professor 
Rose has stated: 
The rhetoric of property often seems to resound with the notes of heroic 
autonomy . . .. But such heroic rhetoric rests on the quite mistaken 
notion that this most intensely social of institutions hinges on individual-
ism alone, whereas in fact it thoroughly mixes independence and coopera-
tion. Indeed, taken to an extreme, the in-your-face rhetoric of property 
rights can undermine actual institutions of property, suggesting that any-
thing goes, and that the property owner need not care in the least for 
his fellows. 
Id. at 365. 
HeinOnline -- 38 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1101 1996-1997
1997] COUNTING VOTES 1101 
Such a piercing of the Court's judicial veil offers three lessons 
about -regulatory takings. First, it suggests the propriety of dis-
counting the import of the Court's precedent in individual cases 
and the futility of reconciling what may be, at bottom, irreconcil-
able rulings. Advocates and legal academics who ignore this les-
son routinely conflate the significance of the Court's precedent in 
takings cases. 
Second, by identifying the underlying reasons for the Court's 
splintering and shifting majorities, students of the regulatory 
" takings issue, as well as members of the regulatory and regulat-
ed communities, can appreciate better the full dimensions of the 
issue. By examining the votes of individual Justices in each of 
the cases, the questions asked at oral argument, and the argu-
ments made in the briefs, one discovers the full panoply of fac-
tors that have influenced the Justices in takings cases. These 
factors extend beyond the traditional debate between prepolitical 
and civic conceptions of property. By tugging in an oppositional 
fashion at the Justices, these factors implicate a host of crosscut-
ting issues that make maintaining the development of a stable 
majority on regulatory takings issues especially difficult. 
Finally, a more focused examination of the individual Justices 
suggests the kinds of arguments that a new majority coalition of 
Justices now on the Court might find acceptable. Justice Kenne-
dy will be the decisive vote in the establishment of this new ma-
jority, and pragmatism will need to replace adherence to purist 
principles in any advocacy designed to promote an analytical 
framework capable of being embraced by a new majority led by 
Justice Kennedy. 
This Essay consists of three parts, followed by a brief conclu-
sion. The three parts roughly mirror the three lessons to be 
learned in undertaking a closer examination of the reasons why 
the Court's regulatory takings precedent exhibits such conflict 
and doctrinal instability. First, the Essay describes the general 
benefit gained from thinking of the Court as nine distinct Justices 
in analyzing the Court's precedent, with illustrations from the 
Court's takings precedent. Next, in\ an effort to identify the wide-
ranging factors that actually are at work in establishing a ma-
jority on the Court in particular cases, the Essay explores a vari-
ety of source materials, ranging from opinions of individual Jus-
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tices to oral argument transcripts to the briefs of the advocates 
themselves. Finally, the Essay makes a preliminary attempt to 
identify an analytical framework for the regulatory takings issue 
that, although lacking purity of principle and perhaps bordering 
on the nihilistic, may provide instead the level of pragmatism 
necessary to strike an acceptable balance between opposing views. 
I. LESSON NUMBER ONE: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE 
CONSTITUTION'S "RULE OF FIVE" FOR UNDERSTANDING AND 
RELYING UPON THE COURT'S REGULATORY TAKINGS PRECEDENT 
Supreme Court lore reports that Justice Brennan would ask 
his new law clerks to identify the single most important rule of 
constitutional law. Following a heated debate, with each law 
clerk undoubtedly seeking to impress the Justice with his or her 
profound understanding of federal constitutional law, Justice 
Brennan reportedly would announce them all wrong. The most 
important rule, he would declare, is the "rule of five"-i.e., the 
Court decides cases by a majority vote of at least five Justices.7 
Justice Brennan reportedly practiced what he preached. Upon 
his resignation from the Court, many testified to his special abil-
ity to forge surprising majority coalitions in controversial cases.8 
The regulatory takings cases illustrate well the importance of 
the "rule of five." Many of the decisions have only five Justices 
joining the majority opinion, and there has been no consistent 
majority.9 The difference between the majority and dissent has 
been stark, just as it first was in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. 
Mahon. 10 The reasoning of the majority in one case becomes 
7. Mark V. Tushnet, Themes in Warren Court Biographies, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 
748, 763 (1995). 
8. See Thurgood Marshall, A Tribute to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., 104 
HARv. L. REv. 1, 5 (1990); Abner J. Mikva, A Tribute to Justice William J. Brennan, 
Jr., 104 HARv. L. REv. 9, 10 (1990); Richard A. Posner, A Tribute to Justice William 
J. Brennan, Jr., 104 HARv. L. REv. 13, 14 (1990); Nina Totenberg, A Tribute to Jus· 
tice William J. Brennan, Jr., 104 HARv. L. REv. 33, 37-38 (1990). 
9. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 
U.S. 825 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 
(1987); MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340 (1986); San 
Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981). 
10. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
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that of the dissent in the next (and vice versa)-sometimes with 
very little time separating the Court's changing decisions. 
Consider, for example, the Court's famed 1986 Term takings 
trilogy, wherein the Court decided in rapid succession three sig-
nificant regulatory takings cases: Keystone Bituminous Coal 
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,11 decided in March, and First English 
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles12 and 
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,13 both decided in 
June. Keystone Bituminous and Nollan are rooted in wholly .in-
compatible notions of the relationship between private property 
and police power regulation.14 Although to a lesser extent, it is 
similarly difficult to square the jurisprudential underpinnings of 
First English with the Court's ruling in Keystone Bituminous.15 
If one views the Court as a monolith, it is very difficult to dis-
cern the theory that unifies these three rulings. The Court cer-
tainly makes little, if any, effort to do so. If one instead views 
the Court as reflecting coalitions of individual Justices, the pic-
ture becomes more clear. Justice White was the only Justice in 
the majority in all three cases, but he wrote none of the opinions 
for the COurt;16 nor did he write any separate concurring opin-
ions. It is therefore more important to ask what made a differ-
ence for Justice White in these cases than to undertake a fiction-
al inquiry into the Court's unifying theory in support of these 
three rulings. 
Examining the votes of individual Justices also suggests the 
real possibility that one of the most discussed of regulatory tak-
ings cases in recent years, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
11. 480 U.S. 470 (1987). 
12. 482 U.S. 304 (1987). 
13. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
14. Compare Keystone Bituminous, 480 U.S. at 486-88 (maintaining that the state 
can exercise its police power broadly "to accomplish a number of widely varying in-
terests"), with Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836-37 (holding that land-use regulation must 
"further the end advanced as the justification for the prohibition"). 
15. See First English, 482 U.S. at 314-22 (holding that even temporary takings 
must be compensated). 
16. Justice White authored majority opinions for the Court in two cases raising 
regulatory takings claims, Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 475 U.S. 211 
(1986), and United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985). He 
also dissented in another, MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 
340, 353 (1986). 
HeinOnline -- 38 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1104 1996-1997
1104 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1099 
Council,17 no longer represents viable precedent, at least in the 
United States Supreme Court. As in many of the regulatory tak-
ings cases, only five Justices joined the Court's majority in 
Lucas.1s Justice White was, again, the decisive vote. What very 
few have remarked upon, however, is that Justice White an-
nounced his resignation from the Court less than a year after 
Lucas was decided. 19 
Hence, the slim Lucas majority vanished almost upon its ar-
rival. There are no longer five Justices on the Court who clearly 
support Justice Scalia's rationale. Yet, commentator after com-
mentator insists on treating Lucas as weighty precedent, with-
out remarking on its current vulnerability.20 Lucas is, of course, 
entitled to dispositive weight in the lower courts. Those courts 
are supposed to adhere to Supreme Court precedent until it is 
modified formally,21 no matter how clear it may be that shifts 
in the Court's composition will prompt its undoing as soon as 
the Court again addresses the issue. The Supreme Court is not 
similarly circumscribed.22 In the Supreme Court, one should 
17. 505 u.s. 1003 (1992). 
18. The majority in Lucas consisted of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices 
White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas. See id. 
19. Lucas was decided on June 29, 1992, see id., and Justice White announced his 
resignation on March 19, 1993. See Linda Greenhouse, White Announces He'll Step 
Down from High Court, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 20, 1993, at AI. 
20. A number of law review symposia followed on the heels of Lucas, none of 
which considered the significance of the subsequent shift in the Court's composition. 
See, e.g., James E. Brookshire, "Taking" the Time To Look Backward, 42 CATH. U. 
L. REv. 901 (1993); Dennis J. Coyle, Takings Jurisprudence and the Political Cul· 
tures of American Politics, 42 CATH. U. L. REv. 817 (1993); John A. Humbach, "Tak-
ing" the Imperial Judiciary Seriously: Segmenting Property Interests and Judicial 
Revision of Legislative Judgments, 42 CATH. U. L. REv. 771 (1993); Glynn S. 
Lunney, Jr., Compensation for Takings: How Much Is Just?, 42 CATH. U. L. REv. 
721 (1993); Katherine A. Bayne, Note, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: 
Drawing a Line in the Sand, 42 CATH. U. L. REv. 1063 (1993). 
21. See, e.g., Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982) ("[U]nless we wish anarchy 
to prevail within the federal judicial system, a precedent of this Court must be fol-
lowed by the lower federal courts . . . . "). There are, of course, a few lower court 
judges who appear to exercise a free hand with the Supreme Court's precedent. See 
Francis Wilkinson, Judge Hand's Holy War, AM. LAw., May 1987, at 111. 
22. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) ("[TJhe rule 
of stare decisis is not an 'inexorable command' . . .. Rather, when this Court reex-
amines a prior holding, its judgment is customarily informed by a series of pruden-
tial and pragmatic considerations . . . . "); see also Linda Greenhouse, High Court 
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expect Lucas to receive a very narrow reading. 
Indeed, the litigation before the Court in Lucas reflected a 
similar development. The Court's decision in Keystone Bitumi-
nous provided those defending the South Carolina Coastal Coun-
cil with seemingly powerful precedent in support of the chal-
lenged South Carolina coastal development law.23 The holding 
in Keystone Bituminous seemed unequivocal; the Court largely 
limited Pennsylvania Coal to its facts, concluding that a taking 
had not occurred and that the state can properly exercise its 
police power "to abate activity akin to a public nuisance."24 All 
of the litigants before the Court in Lucas, however, were well 
aware that despite its recent vintage, Keystone Bituminous was 
shaky, and therefore risky, precedent upon which to rely. At the 
time that Lucas was decided, the Court consisted of three Justic-
es (Stevens, White, and Blackmun) from the Keystone Bitumi-
nous majority and three (Rehnquist, Scalia, and O'Connor) from 
the dissent. At least two (Thomas and Kennedy) of the three 
new Justices seemed inclined to follow the Keystone Bituminous 
dissenters.25 For this reason, it was risky for government law-
yers in Lucas to rely heavily on Keystone if they hoped to obtain 
Justice O'Connor's vote. Although they needed the vote of Jus-
tice White, who was in the Keystone majority, government law-
yers could not afford to alienate Justice O'Connor. Such alien-
ation might have resulted, however, if their advocacy left an im-
pression that accepting their argument required Justice 
O'Connor to embrace the Court's ruling in Keystone, from which 
she recently had dissented. Accordingly, neither the brief filed 
Asked To Reuerse Ruling in a Religion Case, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 31, 1996, at AI. 
23. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). 
24. Id. at 488. 
25. Justice Thomas's speeches and writings prior to joining the Court suggested 
his strong support for an aggressive reading of the Fifth Amendment Just Compen-
sation Clause, notwithstanding his efforts during the confirmation process to distance 
himself from that view. See Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas To Be Associate 
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 102d Congo 110-27 (1991).-Just a few months before Lucas was 
before the Court, Justice Kennedy gave a speech at a law school in which he 
stressed the centrality of private property rights under the Federal Constitution. See 
Robert A. Chaim, Justice Kennedy Inaugurates the Archie Hefner Memorial Lecture 
Series, MCGEORGE MAG., 1991, at 10-11; infra text accompanying note 39. 
HeinOnline -- 38 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1106 1996-1997
1106 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1099 
by the South Carolina Coastal Council nor the brief filed by the 
United States as amicus curiae, made Keystone a centerpiece of 
its argument.26 
The same strategic considerations should now be present for 
any party making a regulatory takings claim before the current 
Supreme Court. The more the party links the merits of its claim 
to the Court's decision in Lucas-which is what most advocates 
would naturally do-the more that party would risk losing its 
case before the Court. The "rule of five" is unforgiving; you need 
five votes. There are, at most, only four votes on the current 
Court (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, 
and Thomas) to support the reasoning of the majority in Lucas. 
Further, no reason exists to suppose that either of the two 
Justices who have joined the Court since Lucas was decided 
(Justices Ginsburg and Breyer) is likely to vote with the four 
Justices left from the Lucas majority. Quite the opposite conclu-
sion is instead likely to be true. 
In Dolan v. City of Tigard,27 a case that Justice Kennedy 
(who provided the fifth vote) thought was easier than Lucas for 
the plaintiff property owner,28 Justice Ginsburg refused to join 
the four Justices left from the Lucas majority. She instead 
joined the dissenting opinion filed by the same Justices who 
dissented similarly in Lucas.29 
26. See Brief for Respondent, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 
1003 (1992) (No. 91-453); Brief for the United States As Amicus Curiae in Support 
of Reversal, Lucas (No. 91-453). 
27. 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
28. Although Justice Kennedy joined the mlijority opinion in Dolan, he declined to 
do so in Lucas, expressly stating that he "shareldl the reservations" of his dissenting 
colleagues, Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter, "about a finding that a 
beachfront lot loses all its value because of a development restriction." Lucas, 505 
U.S. at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
29. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 396 (Stevens, J., with whom Blackmun & Ginsburg, 
JJ., join, dissenting). During the Senate hearings on her nomination to the Court, 
then-Judge Ginsburg was deliberately vague about her views on the regulatory tak-
ings issue, though her characterization of Lucq,s perhaps presaged her dissent in 
Dolan. Responding to a question from Senator Pressler, she stated: 
There must be dozens or scores of cases in which litigants are seeking 
clarification of the line between regulation and taking. I can't offer now 
anything more than to say I appreciate that the -issue is very much 
alive, and that the most recent decision, the Lucas decision is hardly the 
be-all-and-end-all. 
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Although Justice Breyer has not yet participated in a regula-
tory takings case, his testimony on the takings issue during his 
confirmation hearings provides little comfort to future plaintiffs 
bringing regulatory takings claims. Justice Breyer essentially 
turned Pennsylvania Coal on its head. He asserted that the Tak-
ings Clause should not "go[ ] too far" so as to present obstacles 
to reasonable government regulation of private property.30 Like 
the dissenters in Dolan,31 Justice Breyer equated aggressive 
readings of the Takings Clause with the Lochner era, contending 
that each suffers from a common flaw: seeking to read into the 
Constitution a specific economic theory.32 Justice Breyer main-
tained that the Constitution cannot and does not contain such a 
theory. Rather, economic theories are a "function of the circum-
stances of the moment. And if the world changes so that it be-
comes crucially important to all of us that we protect the envi-
ronment, that we protect health, that we protect safety, the Con-
stitution is not a bar to that .... "33 
To be sure, the Court does not abandon precedent routinely 
whenever there is a shift in the composition of the Court. There 
is properly much force in the notion of stare decisis, albeit less 
in judicial interpretation of the Constitution than in construction 
of statutory provisions. Much of the Court's precedent remains 
good law, despite the fact that it is likely that to day's Court 
would approach the same issues very differently were the indi-
vidual Justices to address the issues in the first instance. 
The Court's regulatory takings precedent, however, exhibits 
no such judicial hesitancy to strike out anew. The Court instead 
routinely has ignored recent rulings. The Court also has read its 
own decisions very narrowly. That is the likely fate of Lucas 
should the current Court revisit the issue. Although Justice 
Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg To Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of 
the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Congo 
238 (1993) (statement of Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg). 
30. See S. EXEC. REp. No. 103-31, at 22 (1994). 
31. See, e.g., Dolan, 512 U.S. at 406-07 (Stevens, J., with whom Blackmun & 
Ginsburg, JJ., join, dissenting) ("The so-called 'regulatory takings' doctrine • . . has 
an obvious kinship with the line of substantive due process cases that Lochner ex-
emplified."). 
32. See S. EXEC. REP. No. 103-31, at 23. 
33. Id. 
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Kennedy concurred in the judgment of Lucas,34 which vacated 
the lower court's ruling and remanded the case for further pro-
ceedings, there was a tremendous gulf between his rationale for 
doing so and that of Justice Scalia's majority, which Justice 
Kennedy pointedly declined to join. 
Justice Kennedy rejected in its entirety the majority's founda-
tional claim-that background principles of the common law, 
such as nuisance law as applied by judges, provide an exclusive 
touchstone for excusing a police power measure that severely 
restricts the use of privately owned land.35 Kennedy insisted 
that such common law doctrine should not be "the sole source of 
state authority to impose severe restrictions."36 He affirmative-
ly asserted that on especially fragile ecosystems a state must be 
able to restrict development and use more severely "than the 
common law of nuisance might otherwise permit," without trig-
gering the Fifth Amendment's just compensation guarantee.37 
There is no reason to suppose that Justice Kennedy's refusal 
to join the Lucas majority was undertaken lightly. Justice Ken-
nedy is not a Justice who routinely writes separate concurring 
opinions that concur only in the judgment. He does so occasion-
ally, generally joining his conservative colleagues' opinions, as 
he has done in other regulatory takings cases.3S 
Justice Kennedy also has declared publicly his strong inclina-
tions in favor of an aggressive reading of the Fifth Amendment's 
Just Compensation Clause for the protection of private property 
rights. In a speech delivered not long before Lucas came before 
the Court, he recognized the clash between the Lockean, 
prepolitical, natural rights conception of private property and 
the Hobbesian view that property rights emanate exclusively 
34. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1032 (1992) (Kenne-
dy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
35. See id. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgement) ("The common law 
of nuisance is too narrow a confine for the exercise of regulatory power in a complex 
and interdependent society."). 
36. [d. 
37. [d. 
38. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 377 (1994) (Rehnquist, C.J., 
writing for the majority, joined by O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, & Thomas, JJ.); cf. 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1032 (1992) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
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from the State.39 Justice Kennedy commented specifically on 
the Court's reluctance since Lochner to take an active role in 
defending property rights and speculated that it was time for 
the Court to return to that role to ensure that the right to pri-
vate property does not become a "second-class right": "[P]roperty 
provides the structural vehicle through which we can protect 
ourselves against a blueprint for the future being imposed by 
government ... ever hungry for self-aggrandizement. "40 
Consequently, Justice Kennedy's decision not to join the Lucas 
majority, but rather to write separately, is especially significant. 
The Justices do not pay equal attention to all issues. As would 
be expected, the Justices take greater care and spend more time 
on the issues that matter most to each of them. The takings is-
sue clearly is such an issue for Justice Kennedy. He is develop-
ing a vision of how to resolve the tensions that exist between 
private property rights and the police power of the state. Al-
though Justice Kennedy naturally is sympathetic to private 
property rights, he does not believe that Justice Scalia has 
struck the right chord in his majority opinion for the Court in 
Lucas. Otherwise, as Justice Kennedy has done in other cases, 
he would have both joined the majority opinion and supplement-
ed his views with a concurring opinion, rather than merely con-
curring in the judgment.41 
If one were to argue a regulatory takings case before the Su-
preme Court today, it would be sensible to pay at least as much 
heed to Justice Kennedy's concurring rationale as to the ratio-
nale found in the Lucas majority opinion. It is more likely that 
the view expounded by Justice Kennedy, not by the Lucas ma-
jority, speaks for the Court today on regulatory takings issues. 
39. See Chaim, supra note 25, at 10-11. 
40. Id. 
41. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1625 (1995) (Rehnquist, 
C.J., writing for the majority joined by O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy & Thomas, JJ.); 
id. at 1634 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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II. LESSON NUMBER Two: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE VOTES OF 
INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES IN REVEALING THE CROSSCUTTING IsSUES 
BEHIND THE MAJORITIES AND DISSENTS IN THE COURT'S 
DECISIONS 
Commentators often criticize Justices for voting in seemingly 
anomalous or inconsistent ways.42 Anomaly and inconsistency 
are condemned as such.43 In other disciplines, however, anoma-
ly presents a positive opportunity. In science, for example, the 
discovery of an anomaly-an observation that does not square 
with established theory--can be a moment of celebration and not 
despair. Anomaly presents a possible window for fuller under-
standing of a phenomenon being studied.44 Physicists developed 
the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics because of the 
increasing failure of Newtonian classic mechanics to explain ex-
perimental observations such as the photoelectric effect.45 In 
evolutionary biology, some believe that the genetic anomaly can 
provide the impetus for species adaptation and advance.46 
Anomaly can be similarly useful in identifying the motivations 
behind tpe Justices' voting in unexpected ways. Rather than 
calling for conclusory criticism, the unexpected vote can be seen 
42. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 
HARv. L. REv. 687, 756-57 (1990); Betsy Levin, Educating Youth for Citizenship: The 
Conflict Between Authority and Individual Rights in the Public School, 95 YALE L.J_ 
1647, 1658-60 (1986); The Supreme Court, 1992 Term-Leading Cases, 107 HARv_ L. 
REV. 144, 270 (1993); The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Leading Cases, 103 HARv. L. 
REv. 137, 326 (1989). 
43. But see Christopher J. Peters, Foolish Consistency: On Equality, Integrity, and 
Justice, 105 YALE L.J. 2031, 2113 (1996) ("[01ur courts finally must rid themselves 
of the habit of thinking that adjudicative consistency holds some inherent value tug-
ging them away from what is just."). 
44. 
Discovery commences with the awareness of anomaly, i.e., with the recog-
nition that nature has somehow violated the paradigm-induced expecta-
tions that govern normal science. It then continues with a more or less 
extended exploration of the area of anomaly. And it closes only· when the 
paradigm theory has been adjusted so that the anomalous has become 
the expected. 
THoMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 52-53 (2d ed. 1970). 
45. See RICHARD FEYNMAN, THE CHARACTER OF PHYSICAL LAw 162-63 (1965); see 
also id. at 158 ("In other words we are trying to prove ourselves wrong as quickly 
as possible, because only in that way can we find progress."). 
46. See STEPHEN JAY GoULD, THE PANDA'S THUMB 186-93 (1980). 
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as a window revealing the factors likely to prompt an individual 
Justice to vote one way rather than another in a regulatory tak-
ings case. It is instructive to determine what competing consid-
eration sufficed to warrant abandoning apparently consistent 
decision making.47 To that end, this portion of the Essay identi-
fies voting patterns of several Justices. Each Justice is discussed 
separately. Of special emphasis in this Essay are any votes that 
might seem counterintuitive or otherwise surprising. Their sur-
prising nature makes them potentially the most revealing. In 
particular, they may suggest that those crosscutting issues un-
derlying the regulatory takings debate play a far larger role in 
influencing the Court's rulings than has been expressly acknowl-
edged by the opinions themselves. 
A. The Unexpected in Justice Voting 
Justice White is the easy case for highlighting vote shifting in 
the Court's regulatory takings cases.4S He is, however, hardly 
alone. With the exception of Justice Scalia, there is a surprising 
amount of movement in how individual Justices vote in regulato-
ry takings cases on the Court. Surveyed below are the voting 
patterns of Justice Brennan and several of the current Justices, 
other than Justice Kennedy, who have played significant roles in 
the Court's takings jurisprudence during the past two decades. 
1. Chief Justice Rehnquist 
Many would assume that Chief Justice Rehnquist has adhered 
to a fairly steady line of decision in takings cases. Not so. Al-
though one can fairly characterize the Chief Justice as generally 
sympathetic to the claims of private property owners, his writ-
ings and votes are not without qualification and some judicial 
backtracking. 
For instap.ce, in Kaiser Aetna v. United States,49 then-Justice 
Rehnquist wrote the opinion for the Court in which he declared 
47. C{. John E. Coons, Consistency, 75 CAL. L. REv. 59, 112-13 (1987) ("[1)ncon-
sistency's most compelling claim for recognition may lie in its potential service to 
truth."). 
48. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
49. 444 U.S. 164 (1979). 
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the "fundamental" 'nature of the property owner's "right to ex-
clude. "50 The Court ruled in Kaiser Aetna that the federal 
government's insistence on public access to a navigable private 
marina constituted a taking of property requiring compensa-
tion.51 Just a few months later, however, then-Justice 
Rehnquist authored a unanimous opinion for the Court in 
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins.52 In that case, the Gourt 
ruled that the "right to exclude" was not fundamental to a shop-
ping center owner who had failed to demonstrate that his ability 
to exclude certain leafleteers was "essential to the use or eco-
nomic value of [his] property .... "53 
Similarly, contrasts exist between the opinion that the Chief 
Justice wrote for the Court in Dolan v. City of Tigard54 and 
Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Nollan v. California 
Coastal Commission.55 The tone of Dolan is decidedly different 
from the one that Justice Scalia set for the Court in Nollan. The 
Dolan opinion is discernibly more tempered, more deferential, 
and ultimately more respectful of the workings of, and necessity 
for, state and local land-use regulation.56 In this respect, the 
Dolan opinion may share some common roots with PruneYard, 
which rests similarly on notions of federalism and the primacy 
of state law for the definition of private property rights.57 
PruneYard is not the only case in which the Chief Justice sid-
ed with the government in a takings case. He joined Justice 
Brennan's opinion for the Court in Andrus v. Allard,58 which 
50. Id. at 179-80. 
51. See id. at 180. 
52. 447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
53. Id. at 84. 
54. 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
55. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
56. See, e.g., Dolan, 512 U.S. at 387 ("No ... gimmicks are associated with the 
permit conditions imposed by the city in this case."); id. at 396 ("Cities have long 
engaged in the commendable task of land use planning, made necessary by increas-
ing urbanization particularly in metropolitan areas such as Portland. The city's 
goals ... are laudable, but there are outer limits on how this may be done."). 
57. PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 84-85 (referring to the "residual authority (of a State) 
that enables it to define 'property' in the first instance" and "the State's asserted 
interest in promoting more expansive rights of free speech and petition than con-
ferred by the Federal Constitution"). 
58. 444 U.S. 51 (1979). 
HeinOnline -- 38 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1113 1996-1997
1997] COUNTING VOTES 1113 
used very strong proregulation rhetoric in rejecting a takings 
challenge to the Eagle Protection Act59 and the Migratory Bird 
Treaty Act,60 both of which restricted the sale of eagle feath-
ers.61 Rehnquist also joined Justice Blackmun's majority opin-
ion for the Court in Ruckelshaus u. Monsanto Co., 62 which re-
jected most, but not all, of a takings claim brought against the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) based on trade secret 
disclosure requirements under the Federal Insecticide, Fungi-
cide, and Rodenticide Act.63 
This past Term, in Bennis u. Michigan,64 the Chief Justice, 
writing for a slim five-Justice majority, dismissively rejected a 
plaintiff's claim that a state criminal forfeiture law amounted to 
an unconstitutional taking of private property.65 In Bennis, the 
plaintiff herself had committed no crime, yet she lost her title to 
an automobile that she and her husband owned jointly when he 
had used the automobile in the crime of soliciting a prostitute.66 
Employing somewhat elliptical reasoning, the Chief Justice's 
opinion for the Court tersely stated that "[t]he government may 
not be required to compensate an owner for property which it has 
already lawfully acquired under the exercise of governmental au-
thority other than the power of eminent domain."67 
Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist's view of the role of nuisance 
law in takings analysis has shifted significantly over the years. 
In Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n u. DeBenedictis,66 Rehnquist 
wrote in his dissent that "our cases have never applied the nui-
sance exception to allow complete extinction of the value of a 
parcel of property."69 That claim is inconsistent with his earlier 
dissenting statement in Penn Central Transportation Co. u. New 
59. 16 U.S.C. § 668(a) (1994). 
60. Id. § 703. 
61. See Allard, 444 U.S. at 67-68. 
62. 467 U.S. 986 (1984). 
63. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1994); see Ruckleshaus, 467 U.S. at 1013-14. 
64. 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996). 
65. See id. at 1001. 
66. See id. at 996. 
67. Id. at 1001. 
68. 480 U.S. 470 (1987). 
69. Id. at 513. 
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York City70 that the Court's precedent established "two excep-
tions [to the Takings Clause] where the destruction of property 
does not constitute a taking,"71 one of which was when the "for-
bidden use is dangerous to the safety, health, or welfare of oth-
ers.'>72 Significantly, Chief Justice Rehnquist did not equate the 
nuisance exception to common law precedent but seemed to al-
low for more broadly based exercises of the police power restrict-
ing such dangerous uses of property.73 More recently, however, 
the Chief Justice joined the majority opinion in Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council,74 which rejected both his Keystone 
Bituminous analysis by embracing a nuisance exception75 and 
his Penn Central analysis by seeming to limit the nuisance ex-
ception to judicial application of the common law.76 
2. Justice Brennan 
Justice Brennan was generally a reliable vote for the govern-
ment in regulatory takings cases, just as Chief Justice 
Rehnquist was generally a reliable vote against the government. 
As with the Chief Justice, however, factors could arise that 
would prompt Justice Brennan to change his usual voting pat-
tern. To the great dismay of government regulators and environ-
mentalists, Justice Brennan sided with those favoring a consti-
tutionally required money damage remedy in his dissent in San 
Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego,77 a case in which 
the majority invoked procedural grounds to avoid reaching the 
ultimate issue.78 It was not long before property owners real-
ized the potential for victory that Justice Brennan's realignment 
promised, in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. 
70. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
71. [d. at 144. 
72. [d. at 145. 
73. See id. ("The nuisance exception to the taking guarantee is not coterminous 
with the police power itself."). 
74. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
75. See id. at 1027-32. 
76. See id. at 1029. 
77. 450 U.S. 621, 653 (1981) (Brennan, J., with whom Stewart, Marshall, & 
Powell, JJ., join, dissenting). 
78. See id. at 631-33. 
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County of Los Angeles.79 
To be sure, one can posit a distinction between the Fifth 
Amendment remedy issue and the threshold issue of whether a 
regulation effects a taking in the first instance. Justice Stevens, 
however, has the better argument in contending that the two 
issues cannot be divided so neatly. so Justice Brennan's view 
that there must be a remedy for temporary takings reflects an 
intolerance toward government interference with property rights 
that is at odds with the legal theory underlying the opinions 
that he joined and authored rejecting takings claims on the 
merits.S1 The temporal restrictions that Justice Brennan agreed 
mandate just compensation do not differ fundamentally from the 
spatial restrictions that he concluded do not mandate compensa-
tion.S2 In a less charitable moment in his dissent in Nollan v. 
California Coastal Commission,83 Justice Stevens chastised' 
Justice Brennan for failing to perceive the inconsistency and, in 
Justice Stevens's view, unfairly subjecting land-use regulation to 
unrealistic constitutional standards.84 
79. 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (holding that the government must compensate property 
owners for a temporary taking). 
80. See id. at 328-35 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
81. See id. at 330-31 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing Keystone Bituminous and 
Penn Central). 
82. See id. at 330 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Regulations are three dimensional; 
They have depth, width, and length. . . . It is obvious that no one of these elements 
can be analyzed alone to evaluate the impact of a regulation, and hence to deter-
mine whether a taking has occurred."). 
83. 483 U.S. 825, 866 (1987). 
84. 
I write today to identify the severe tension between [the decision in First 
English] and the view expressed by JUSTICE BRENNAN's dissent in this 
case that the public interest is served by encouraging state agencies to 
exercise considerable flexibility in responding to private desires for devel-
opment in a way that threatens the preservation of public resources. I 
like the hat that JUSTICE BRENNAN has donned today better than the one 
he wore in San Diego, and I am persuaded that he has the better of the 
legal arguments here. Even if his position prevailed in this case, howev-
er, it would be of little solace to land-use planners who would still be 
left; guessing about how the Court will react to the next case, and the 
one after that. As this case demonstrates, the rule of liability created by 
the Court in First English is a shortsighted one. Like JUSTICE BRENNAN, 
I hope that a "broader vision ultimately prevails." 
Id. at 867 (Stevens, J., with whom Blackmun, J., joins, dissenting) (citations omitted). 
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3. Justice Stevens 
Justice Brennan did not respond to Justice Stevens's criticism 
of him in Nollan. Had Justice Brennan chosen to respond in 
kind, he certainly could have reminded Justice Stevens that his 
own record did not reflect a wholly steady view in takings cases. 
Justice Stevens has authored more opinions than most Justices 
have in favor of government regulators in takings cases, writing 
the majority opinion in Keystone Bituminous, concurring in the 
judgment in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission 
v. Hamilton Bank,55 and dissenting in First English, Nollan, 
Lucas, and Dolan. Many forget, however, that Justice Stevens 
joined then-Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Penn Central, having 
declined to join Justice Brennan's majority opinion for the Court. 
Justice Stevens likewise joined the majority ruling in Loretto v. 
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.86 that a taking had oc-
curred,87 again declining to join Justice Brennan in dissent.88 
In Loretto, Justice Stevens embraced a per se approach to the 
takings issue that presaged a mode of analysis that he subse-
quently criticized as unduly rigid when the Court extended its 
application in Lucas.89 
4. Justice O'Connor 
Justice O'Connor's views exhibit more consistency than many 
of the other members of the Court. She has tended to be among 
the most aggressive in her defense of private property rights. 
She joined the dissenters in Keystone Bituminous, and the ma-
jority in Nollan, Lucas, and Dolan. Unlike her voting tendencies 
in other areas of constitutional law,oo she declined to join Jus-
85. 473 u.s. 172, 202 (1985). 
86. 458 u.s. 419, 420 (1982). 
87. See id. at 441-42. 
88. See id. at 442. 
89. Compare id. at 434-35 ("[W]hen the 'character of the governmental action,' ... is 
a permanent physical occupation of property, our cases uniformly have found a taking 
to the extent of the occupation, without regard to whether the action achieves an im-
portant public health benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the owner."), 
with Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1071 (1992) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) ("'[FJairness and justice' are often disserved by categorical rules."). 
90. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995); Planned 
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tice Kennedy's effort in Lucas to set forth a more moderate con-
stitutional vision of the Fifth Amendment. Perhaps even more 
revealing, Justice O'Connor has in recent years twice taken the 
unusual step of formally dissenting from denials of certiorari in 
regulatory takings cases in which aggrieved landowners sought 
the Court's review.91 Justices generally do not formally record 
their dissents from denial of certiorari. Doing so, therefore, un-
derscores the depth and intensity of the Justice's views. 
If there are any surprises in Justice O'Connor's voting pat-
tern, they are likely to be found in her position on the remedy 
issue. On this issue, her votes to some extent are the mirror im-
age of Justice Brennan's. In MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. 
County of Yolo,92 Justice O'Connor joined Justice Stevens's ma-
jority, which declined to reach the remedy issue.93 Then, in 
First English, Justice O'Connor joined parts of Justice Stevens's 
dissent, which expressed both concern about respecting state 
courts94 and skepticism about the merits of the threshold tak-
ings claim.95 In First English, the landowner challenged a law 
that restricted its ability to operate a camp for the disabled in 
an area that the government deemed unsafe because of the 
threat of fiooding.96 Review of the oral argument reveals Justice 
O'Connor's concern with the dangers of such a use of the proper-
ty.97 That same concern also may have provided" the impetus for 
Justice Scalia's assertion in the majority opinion in Lucas that 
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
91. See Parking Ass'n v. City of Atlanta, 115 S. Ct. 2268 (1995) (Thomas, cT., with 
whom O'Connor, J., joins, dissenting); Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 
1207 (1994) (Scalia, J., with whom O'Connor, J., joins, dissenting). 
92. 477 U.S. 340 (1986). 
93. See id. at 348-53. 
94. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 
U.S. 304, 335-39 (1987) (Stevens, J., with whom Blackmun & O'Connor, JJ., join, 
dissenting as to Parts I and III). 
95. See id. at 322-28 (Stevens, J., with whom Blackmun & O'Connor, JJ., join, 
dissenting as to Parts I and III). 
96. See id. at 307-08. 
97. See Official Transcript Proceedings Before the Supreme Court of the United 
States at 26, First English (No: 85-1199) [hereinafter First English Oral Argument 
Transcript] (questions posed by Justice O'Connor) ("[D]o you think that local govern-
ments don't have authority to engage in flood control regulation? . . . And does the 
church plan to rebuild on a flood plain where people have been killed?"). 
HeinOnline -- 38 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1118 1996-1997
1118 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1099 
prohibiting development that would flood another's property 
could destroy all economic value without constituting a taking of 
property.98 Because Justice O'Connor supplied Justice Scalia 
with the crucial fifth vote in Lucas, Justice Scalia may have 
been responding to Justice Brennan's "rule of five. »99 
5. Justice Scalia 
No one could contend that Justice Scalia has not adhered to a 
firm position in the regulatory takings cases. Property owners 
have no greater ally on the Court. He opposed the property 
owner's loss in Keystone Bituminousloo and voted with the ma-
jority in support of private property rights in First English, 
Nollan, Lucas, and Dolan. Not coincidentally, his majority opin-
ions for the Court in both Nollan and Lucas included some of 
the most sweeping and potentially far-reaching rhetoric promot-
ing Fifth Amendment protection of private property rights 
against governmental encroachment.lOl 
To discover the revealing anomalies in Justice Scalia's votes, 
one must look beyond the regulatory takings cases. When other 
members of the Court have wavered somewhat in takings cases 
in response to competing concerns, Justice Scalia alone has not. 
By not doing so, however, he necessarily has produced some ten-
sion between his takings jurisprudence and his opinions in other 
areas of constitutional law. Missing from Justice Scalia's analy-
sis in the takings cases is his typical concern that courts not 
98. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505· U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992). 
99. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
100. 480 U.S. 470, 506 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
101. 
We view the Fifth Amendment's Property Clause to be more than a 
pleading requirement, and compliance with it to be more than an exer-
cise in cleverness and imagination. As indicated earlier, our cases de-
scribe the condition for abridgement of property rights through the police 
power as a "Substantial advanc[ing]" of a legitimate state interest. We 
are inclined to be particularly careful about the adjective where the actu-
al conveyance of property is made a condition to the lifting of a land-use 
restriction, since in that context there is heightened risk that the purpose 
is avoidance of the compensation requirement, rather than the stated po-
lice-power objective. 
NoHan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 841 (1987). 
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invoke the Constitution to upset laws enacted by the democrati-
cally elected legislative branch.lo2 Gone is his normal penchant 
for restricting the meaning of the Constitution to the original 
intent of the Framers. lo3 Likewise, remarkably absent is any 
concern with federal courts invoking the federal Constitution to 
override the judgments of state and local governments-a feder-
alism concern.104 
B. The Crosscutting Issues 
There are, of course, many possible explanations for Justices 
shifting their views in regulatory takings cases. One very likely 
possibility is that the individual Justices are not nearly as ob-
sessive as academics suppose them to be about the precise 
meaning of every specific word or phrase in the opinions that 
they write or join. Commentators, therefore, are mistaken if they 
believe that they gain tremendous insight into a particular 
Justice's thinking by performing such word parsing. The opin-
ions a,re often a joint product, very much the result of collabora-
tive efforts among the Justice, his or her law clerks, and the 
views of other chambers.lo5 When the opinion is one for the 
Court or for several Justices joining in a separate opinion, ac-
commodation of competing views is necessary. lOS 
102. See Humbach, supra note 20, at 771-72; see also RoBERT H. BORK, THE 
TEMPl'ING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 229·30 (1990) (criti-
cizing Richard Epstein's reading of the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause 
as permitting judicial usurpation of legislative judgment). 
103. See Michael J. Gerhardt, A Tale of Two Textualists: A Critical Comparison of Jus· 
tices Black and Scalia, 74 B.U. L. REV. 25, 61-63 (1994); see also BORK, supra note 102, 
at 230 ("My difficulty is not that Epstein's constitution would repeal much of the New 
Deal and the modem regulatory-welfare state but rather that these conclusions are not 
plausibly related to the original understanding of the takings e<lause."). 
104. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence: A Comment 
on Lucas and Judicial Conservatism, 35 WM. & MARy L. REv. 301, 307, 310-28 (1993). 
105. See Charles W. Collier, The Use and Abuse of Humanistic Theory in Law: 
Reexamining the Assumptions of Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship, 41 DUKE L.J. 
191, 229-30 (1991) ("Supreme Court opinions are becoming less . • • the product of 
an individual and powerful mind, less an original text or primary source providing a 
theoretical model for scholarship, and more the product of 'bureaucratic writing' by 
law clerks. • • • They are the proverbial 'work of many hands.'"). 
106. See Kevin M. Stack, Note, The Practice of Dissent in the Supreme Court, 105 
YALE L.J. 2235, 2239 (1996). 
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The Justices also react to the facts of the cases before them 
based on their own life experiences. There may be no conscious 
or even desired effort to develop a coherent unifying legal posi-
tion. Consider, for example, Justice Powell's sympathy for the 
historic preservation regulation challenged in Penn Central and 
his hostility toward restrictions on coal mining challenged in 
Keystone Bituminous.107 Justice Powell's contrasting votes 
might reflect nothing more than his appreciation for historic 
preservation and coal. Each is well established in his home state 
of Virginia, where one finds both Colonial Williamsburg and a 
heavy economic dependence on coal mining. lOS 
The votes of the Justices, however, also suggest the crosscut-
ting issues in regulatory takings cases. No case before the Court 
exists in a vacuum removed from the Court's other precedent. A 
Justice's vote in a case before the Court does not turn simply on 
the particular facts before the Court. Nor does a Justice consider 
the regulatory takings issue in isolation. A Justice inevitably 
considers the relationship of the Court's resolution of the issue 
at hand to other, broader issues that recur frequently in differ-
ent substantive areas of the Court's varied docket. These so-
called "crosscutting" issues provide the common threads between 
rulings and, ultimately, the fabric of the jurisprudence of a sin-
gle Justice. 
What makes the Court's takings jurisprudence so susceptible 
to vote shifting is the way that those crosscutting issues tug at 
individual members in an oppositional fashion in takings cases. 
"Oppositional" in this context refers to a crosscutting issue's ten-
dency to push a Justice toward voting in a way contrary to what 
otherwise might be his or her natural inclination on the primary 
legal issue before the Court. 
107. Cf. Official Transcript Proceedings Before the Supreme Court of the United 
States at 46, Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981) (No. 80-231) (statement of Jus-
tice Powell) (expressing his concern, Justice Powell stated that because of the geo-
graphic characteristics of Virginia, "in many instances the land ha[s] no value what-
ever under the administration of [a surface mining control law]"). 
108. Justice Kennedy's surprising vote in Lucas may reflect his appreciation, based 
on years of living in California, of the hidden perils of residential development in 
potentially unstable ecosystems. See Richard J. Lazarus, Putting the Correct "Spin" 
on Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1411, 1422-23 (1993). 
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For example, a Justice like Scalia naturally might be inclined 
to uphold an executive branch agency's effort to make environ-
mental regulations less demanding and costly to industry, but 
nonetheless might feel equally compelled to reject the agency's 
effort based on the plain meaning of the statutory language. His 
overriding commitment to "plain meaning" construction of statu-
tory language would probably trump any pro-business, 
antiregulatory inclinations that he might harbor.lo9 
In regulatory takings cases, there are a substantial number of 
crosscutting issues that have just such oppositional tendencies. 
These issues may well explain much of the vote shifting that has 
occurred. Even more importantly, however, they may suggest the 
roots of compromise necessary for the establishment of a new 
majority coalition on the Court on the regulatory takings issue. 
1. Original Intent or Understanding 
The Justices routinely debate the significance and meaning of 
the Framers' original intent or understanding in deciding issues 
of constitutional law. l1O Th~ basic notion that the Court should 
109. In City of Chicago 11. Enllironmental Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328 (1994), Jus-
tice Scalia wrote an opinion for the Court that rejected the EPA's interpretation of 
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act which would have allowed municipali-
ties to exempt from costly hazardous waste management regulations the ash gener-
ated from the combustion of municipal waste to produce energy. See id. at 334-35. 
The majority ruled that the meaning of the statutory language was plain and de-
clined to rely on any contrary legislative history. See id. at 337 ("[Ilt is the statute, 
and not the Committee Report, which is the authoritative expression of the 
law .... "). Justice Scalia's penchant for plain meaning construction of statutes and 
his antipathy for legislative history are well established. See Antonin Scalia, Judicial 
Deference to Administratille Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 517; James 
J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of Statutes: Idle 
Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1, 41-42 (1994). 
110. See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995) (holding 
unconstitutional a state constitutional provision limiting the number of federal con-
gressional terms an individual can serve); United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 
(1995) (holding that a gun control law exceeded Congress's authority to regulate 
commerce under the Constitution). The body of legal scholarship on original intent 
and its applications also continues to grow. See RAOUL BERGER, GoVERNMENT BY 
JUDICIARY 363-72 (1977); BORK, supra note 102, at 143-259; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE 
PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 93-161 (1993); Paul Brest, The Misconceilled Quest for the 
Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REv. 204 (1980); H. Jefferson Powell, The Origi-
nal Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REv. 885 (1985). 
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tie the meaning of the Constitution more closely to original in-
tent is more favored by members of the Court identified fre-
quently as conservatives than by those members identified as 
liberals.11l As applied to regulatory takings cases, however, the 
issue of original intent wreaks havoc on what might otherwise 
be natural coalitions within the Court. 112 
The original intent argument generally favors those resisting 
regulatory takings claims against environmental and land-use 
regulation. Little historical evidence exists to support the view 
that the Framers contemplated that the Just Compensation 
Clause would restrict nonphysically invasive police power re-
strictions on the use of private property.1l3 Consequently, sup-
porters of land-use and environmental regulation quickly find 
themselves securing the flag of original intent around their 
cause,114 and conservatives, concerned about unduly prohibitive 
restrictions on private property, find themselves voicing the ex-
pansive constitutional rhetoric that they roundly condemned 
when previously invoked on behalf of civil rights plaintiffs and 
criminal defendants.115 
111. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1643-46 (Thomas, J., conCurring); William H. 
Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REv. 693 (1976); Antonin 
Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849 (1989). 
112. The "liberal" and "conservative" labels are extraordinarily imprecise in describ-
ing the Justices and potentially misleading with regard to the regulatory takings 
issue given the ties of property rights proponents to Lockean liberalism. I nonethe-
less use these labels in this Essay for lack of an alternative shorthand expression 
for describing the predilections of the Justices on certain crosscutting issues. 
113. See J. Peter Byrne, Ten Arguments for the Abolition of the Regulatory Takings 
Doctrine, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 89, 91-96 (1995); William Michael Treanor, The Original 
Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 
782, 785-97 (1995); see also John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Signifi-
cance for Modern Takings Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1252, 1289-93 (1996) ("The 
reason the Framers did not address land use regulation in the Takings Clause is 
that they did not regard it as a taking."). But see Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original 
Understanding of the Taking Clause Is Neither Weak nor Obtuse, 8.8 COLUM. L. REV. 
1630, 1635 (1988). . 
114. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1055-60 (1992) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
115. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994) ("We see no reason why 
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as much a part of the Bill of Rights as 
the First Amendment or Fourth Amendment, should be relegated to the status of 
poor relation in these comparable circumstances."); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028 & n.15 
(agreeing that "early constitutional theorists did not believe the Takings Clause em-
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2. Federalism 
A similar reversal of positions occurs when one relates feder-
alism concerns to the regulatory takings issue. For example, 
those who support environmental protection laws that promote 
national environmental protection objectives have not shied 
away from overriding state and local prerogatives.U6 Conserva-
tive activists, scholars, and judges, however, have decried the 
subjugation of state and local governments to national inter-
ests. ll7 Indeed, the very name of the most prominent of conser-
vative legal think tanks-The Federalist Society-expresses that 
baseline position.1lS 
Each side, however, must display some legal gymnastics in 
addressing the regulatory takings issue. Conservatives trumpet 
the need for federal courts to invoke the federal Constitution to 
override state and local legislative enactments. 119 Liberals, 
however, discover the sanctity of state and local autonomy in 
finding no merit to takings chaIIenges and in emphasizing that 
braced regulations of property at all" and relying on the "historical compact recorded 
in the Takings Clause that has become part of our constitutional culture"). 
116. See Adam Babich, Our Federalism, Our Hazardous Waste, and Our Good For-
tune, 54 MD. L. REv. 1516, 1534-50 (1995); John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federal-
ism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REv. 1183, 1190-99 (1995); Jim Florio, Fed-
eralism Issues Related to the Probable Emergence of the Toxic Substances Control 
Act, 54 MD. L. REv. 1354, 1363-70 (1995); Oliver A. Houck & Michael Rolland, Fed-
eralism in Wetlands Regulation: A Consideration of Delegation of Clean Water Act 
Section 404 and Related Programs to the States, 54 MD. L. REV. 1242, 1244-53 
(1995); Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contem-
porary Models, 54 MD. L. REv. 1141, 1157-65 (1995). 
117. See Daniel A. Farber, The Constitution's Forgotten Cover Letter: An Essay on the 
New Federalism and the Original Understanding, 94 MICH. L. REV. 615, 618-26 (1995). 
118. See Richard Neely, The Politics of Patronage: Empowering Joe Lunchbucket, 4 
CORNELL J.L. & PuB. POL'y 525, 525 (1995) ("The Federalist Society focuses on shift-
ing the level of government decision-making from the federal government to state or 
local government . . . • "). 
119. 
We realize that even our present holding will undoubtedly lessen to some 
extent the freedom and flexibility of land-use planners and governing bod-
ies of municipal corporations when enacting land-use regulations. But such 
consequences necessarily flow from any decision upholding a claim of con-
stitutional right; many of the provisions of the Constitution are designed to 
limit the flexibility and freedom of governmental authorities ...• 
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 
321 (1987). 
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property rights are defined in the first instance by state law.120 
3. Judicial Activism 
Related notions of judicial activism play out similarly in the 
regulatory takings cases. Liberals who tend to be the targets of 
complaints asserting that they support "government by judicia-
ry"121 now launch that same claim at conservatives who pro-
mote aggressive application of the Just Compensation Clause.122 
Similarly, conservatives, apparently enjoying a convenient bout 
of temporary amnesia, enthusiastically turn to the courts to 
champion their vision of wise social and economic policy.l23 
4. Government Distrust 
A fourth crosscutting issue relates to distrust of government 
and individual autonomy. This is an especially problematic fea-
ture of regulatory takings disputes. Liberals and conservatives 
alike exhibit distrust of government, albeit in different contexts. 
Regulatory takings claims, however, can bridge that gap capa-
bly, allowing both groups to concern themselves with possible 
120. 
[The doctrine of exhaustion1 is supported by our respect for the sover-
eignty of the several States and by our interest in having federal judges 
decide federal constitutional issues only on the basis of fully developed 
records. The States' interest in controlling land-use development and in 
exploring all the ramifications of a challenge to a zoning restriction 
should command the same deference from the federal judiciary. 
Id. at 338 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 
1051 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("These cases rest on the principle that the State 
has full power to prohibit an owner's use of property if it is harmful to the public."); 
Byrne, supra note 113, at 111-15 (describing the damage resulting from judicial in-
trusion into state property law). 
121. See BERGER, supra note 110; BoRK, supra note 102. 
122. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 407 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(describing both Lochner and the "'regulatory takings' doctrine" as "having similar 
ancestry" and as "potentially open-ended sources of judicial power to invalidate state 
economic regulations that Members of this Court view as unwise or unfair"); Lucas, 
505 U.S. at 1046 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The Court offers no justification for its 
sudden hostility toward state legislators, and I doubt that it could."); Nollan v. Cali-
fornia Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 846 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[The 
Court's1 narrow conception of rationality, however, has long since been discredited as 
a judicial arrogation of legislative authority."). 
123. See Byrne, supra note 113, at 118-19. 
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governmental abuses. 
Distrust of government provides much of the driving force be-
hind the property rights movement. Justice Holmes long ago 
spoke of the tendency of government, if left unchecked, to define 
away property rights.124 Richard Epstein has written openly of 
the need for the courts to invoke the Fifth Amendment to guard 
against majoritarian efforts to appropriate property owned by 
others.125 Liberals tend to support such redistributive govern-
mental programs, so long as they provide the promise of progres-
siven~ss. In certain settings, however, restrictions on property 
rights more closely approximate interests in individual autono-
my and security than they do "mere" economic interests. When 
individual autonomy is implicated, core liberal concerns with 
governmental overreaching may surface quickly. 
One can speculate- also about how these crosscutting issues 
have, in fact, prompted some of the vote swings discussed previ-
ously. Justice White shifted to support the private property 
plaintiffs in both Lucas and Nollan, in each case supplying Jus-
tice Scalia with the crucial fifth vote. One possible explanation 
for Justice White's shift is that in each of these cases, unlike 
those in which he had sided with the government, the plaintiff 
sought to protect his right to build a home on residential proper-
ty.126 Notions of personal autonomy and security were directly 
implicated. Concerns about governmental overreaching were, 
accordingly, more acute than they might have been had mere 
economic interests been at stake. 
At least in Nollan, plaintiffs counsel seemed to anticipate this 
advantage in presenting his argument. At oral argument, he 
stressed repeatedly the strong connection betweeh the real prop-
erty rights being protected and noneconomic concerns with indi-
vidual autonomy and security. Plaintiffs counsel referred repeat-
edly to the property's use as a "family home" for parents with 
small children.127 He emphasized the personally intrusive na-
124. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
125. See EpSTEIN, supra note 2, at 34446; Thomas W. Merrill, Rent Seeking and 
the Compensation Principle, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 1561, 1584-85 (1986) (reviewing 
Epstein's Takings, supra note 2). 
126. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1008; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 827-28. 
127. See Official Transcript Proceedings Before the Supreme Court of the United 
'. 
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ture of members of the public walking just a few feet away from 
a private residence. He described for the Court how plaintiffs 
small children would be playing in plain view just a few feet 
from where strangers would lurk if the government's position 
were upheld.128 By the time counsel for the government rose to 
defend the state law, the Justices' questions reflected the con-
cerns raised regarding individual security and privacy.129 
Chief Justice Rehnquist's votes likely reflect a similar tug-of-
war. His vote and opinion for the Court in favor of the govern-
ment in PruneYard likely reflected the significant federalism 
concerns found in the case: the right of a state to decide the con-
tent of its own constitution and its own state property laws.13o 
His tempered opinion for the Court in Dolan-tempered relative 
to what Justice Scalia likely would have written for the 
Court-similarly seemed to try to respond to the legitimate 
needs of state and local planners to engage in urban land-use 
planning.13l His recent dismissal of the takings claim in Bennis 
may be explained by his fairly traditional, conservative defer-
ence to government in the area of criminal law enforcement.132 
The advocacy in these cases reveals concerted efforts by coun-
sel to use these crosscutting issues to create the coalitions neces-
sary to yield a favorable judgment. In seeking to move Justices 
like Rehnquist to reject the takings claim, counsel for the appel-
States at 3, 20, Nollan (No. 86-133). 
128. See id. at 14 ("[Pleople can walk along just a few feet from the Nollans' 
house. They can see over the seawall directly into their living room .... Now, as 
any parents of small children, that concerns them."); id. at 19 (stating that the 
Nollans "don't want the people crossing within a few feet of their window, to go out 
and ask them to cross down by the waterway and stay away from their private resi-
dence, for example, if their small children are playing in the backyard"); id. at 20 
("As parents of small children, you're talking about the backyard of their home 
. . . . [Pleople could wander back and forth right next to their windows."); id. at 28 
("(W]e are dealing with a program that takes a very important concern-this is a 
private residence, a family with small children-away from this family to serve a 
program, a statewide program."). 
129. See id. at 40-41 (questions from the Court) ("[Llet's assume there's a person 
down the street that I think-I don't trust him. I mean, he just looks shifty eyed. And 
he takes to walking back and forth seven feet away from my back window, back and 
forth; back and forth"); id. at 42 ("Mr. Nollan thought he bought a privacy buffer."). 
130. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
131. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
132. See supra note 64-67 and accompanying text. 
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lees in PruneYard, as well as the United States government in 
its amicus brief, emphasized federalism concerns, including the 
right of the states to define the scope of state property law and 
the right to petition the government.133 In Dolan, those who 
supported the government's defense against the takings claim 
similarly underscored issues of federalism and complained about 
the tyranny of government by the judiciary. 134 The 
government's brief in Bennis also was replete with reminders of 
the forfeiture's close nexus to a criminal prosecution, plainly de-
signed to appeal to conservatives such as the Chief Justice. 135 
133. The appellees' brief focused on federalism from the start: 
The Federal System of our government allows and encourages the states 
to resolve their peculiar problems under state law. This court's prior deci-
sions concerning expressive activity in shopping centers withheld federal 
protection under the First Amendment, but no decision has undermined 
the states' power to regulate such property to protect fundamental state 
rights. 
Brief of Appellees at 14, PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) 
(No. 79-289); see also Brief for the United States As Amicus Curiae at 21, PruneYard 
(No. 79-289) ("State law conferring rights in property and defining the limitations of 
those rights is, accordingly, ordinarily the source of those rights, rather than a taking . 
of them-especially where, as here, the pertinent state constitutional provision long 
antedates any claim or investment by the [landownerl."). The Chief Justice's concern 
with state law as the primary source of property law is further reflected in an ex-
change with government counsel at oral argument in Ruckelshaus u. Monsanto Co., 
467 U.S. 986 (1984), in which he questioned counsel's characterization of the definition 
of "property" as a question of federal law. See Official Transcript Proceedings Before 
the Supreme Court of the United States at 10, Ruckelshaus (No. 83-196). In Kaiser 
Aetna u. United States, then-Justice Rehnquist's majority 'opinion similarly stressed 
that the marina at issue had always been considered private property under appli-
cable Hawaii law. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179 (1979). 
134. See Brief for Respondent at 30, Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) 
(No. 93-518) ("Petitioner apparently wants the Court to return to those Lochnerian 
days of heightened judicial review of economic regulation, but now under the guise 
of takings analysis rather than through that already-discredited substantive due pro-
cess analysis."); Brief of the National Association of Counties, Council of State Gov-
ernments, National League of Cities, International City/County Management Associa-
tion, National Institute of Municipal Law Officers, and U.S. Conference of Mayors As 
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 12, Dolan (No. 93-518) (citing Lake Coun-
try Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 402 (1979» ("Defer-
ence to the judgments of local governments in the area of land-use regulation is of 
particular importance given the sensitive and complex determinations that such reg-
ulation demands."). 
135. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 
25, Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996) (No. 94-8729) {"Nothing in Lucas or 
Dolan, neither of which involved a forfeiture of property that had been used illegal-
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Understanding Justice Brennan's motivation for siding with 
the landowners seeking a constitutional damage remedy in First 
English and San Diego Gas requires little speculation.13s His 
responsiveness to a crosscutting issue was fairly explicit.137 
Justice Brennan has long been concerned about government 
violations of individual constitutional rights and has supported 
constitutional damage remedies to deter and compensate those 
violations.13s It is not surprising therefore that he would not 
abandon his general support for constitutional damage remedies 
in determining the appropriate remedy for one specific kind of 
constitutional violation, namely regulatory takings. Here again, 
the briefs in the case reveal a concerted effort by advocates to 
attract traditional liberal support for constitutional damage 
remedies.139 The briefs included one written by Pacific Legal 
Foundation lawyers on behalf of the San Diego Urban League, 
arguing that curbing governmental overreaching in land-use 
regulation that adversely affected racial minorities required a 
civil rights remedy.140 
ly, casts doubt on th[e) principle" that "if the ... government's actions comport, pro-
cedurally and substantively, with the terms of a lawfully enacted forfeiture statute, 
it may seize private property without compensating the owner.") (citations omitted); 
id. ("Petitioner did not allege or prove that she took all reasonable steps to prevent 
illegal use of the car."). 
136. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text. 
137. See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 661 n.26 
(1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[I)f a policeman must know the Constitution, then 
why not a planner?"). 
138. Justice Brennan has authored many landmark decisions protecting individual 
rights by allowing for constitutional damage remedies. See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 
446 U.S. 14 (1980) (supporting constitutional damages remedy); Owen v. City of In-
dependence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) (supporting constitutional damages remedy); Davis 
v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (supporting constitutional damages remedy); Monell 
v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (supporting constitutional damages 
remedy); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 
U.S. 388 (1971) (supporting constitutional damages remedy); see also DeShaney v. 
Winnebago County Dep't. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 203 (1989) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting) (supporting constitutional damages remedy). 
139. See, e.g., Brief of Appellant at 37, San Diego Gas (No. 79-678) (citing Owen, 
445 U.S. at 650-51) ("[T)bis Court ... specifically and emphatically held that dam-
age compensation is available and is to be awarded when constitutional rights are 
violated by cities, regardless of the good faith of the action taken."). 
140. The Urban League contended that: 
Just as tbis Court has forbidden exclusion clearly based on race or national 
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Fewer judicial tea leaves evidence why Justice Stevens dis-
sented with then-Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger in 
Penn Central, rather than joining Justice Brennan's majority 
opinion.141 Justice Stevens does not appear later to have sec-
ond-guessed that vote, as he has since invoked that dissenting 
opinion in other cases.142 A likely distinction is that Penn Cen-
tral is the only takings case that involved a regulation targeting 
particular properties and landowners rather than applying to all 
properties equally. The general applicability of the regulation 
was a factor that Justice Stevens subsequently emphasized in 
Lucas while defending South Carolina's law. 143 Counsel for 
Penn Central identified that particular characteristic as "the 
vice of this landmark law. "144 
Finally, Justice O'Connor's votes for the majority in First Eng-
lish (in part) and Yolo County 145 likely reflect her lingering 
concerns about the federalism implications of regulatory takings 
claims.146 Ironically, both she and Justice Brennan perceived 
the same distinction between the merits of a takings claim (i.e., 
whether a taking has occurred) and the remedy issue and, in 
addressing the latter, both willingly allowed other crosscutting 
concerns to shift their votes.147 In First English, however, each 
origin, so should this Court disallow and deter exclusion which is solely 
motivated by a municipal desire to further purely parochial aims to the 
detriment of the economically disadvantaged. A wide range of remedies is 
necessary to ensure municipal responsibility as well as accountability. 
Brief of Amicus Curiae San Diego Urban League, Inc., in Support of Appellant at 19-
20, San Diego Gas (No. 79-678); id. at 23-28 (relying extensively on needs of minori-
ties and on Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court in Owen, 445 U.S. at 622). 
141. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978). . 
142. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491 n.20 (1987). 
143. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1071-74 (1992) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
144. Official Transcript Proceedings Before the Supreme Court of the United States 
at 28, Penn Central (No. 77-444) [hereinafter Penn Central Oral Argument Tran-
script] (statement of Mr. Gribbon); see Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 131 (noting Penn 
Central's concession that no taking occurs if a development restriction is the result 
of a generally applicable law rather than an individual landmark designation). 
145. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340 (1986). 
146. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text. 
147. In joining the majority opinion in Yolo County, Justices O'Connor and Brennan 
agreed that compensation cannot be deemed "just" until "a court knows what use, if 
any, may be made of the affected property." Yolo County, 477 U.S. at 350. 
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managed to offset the other as they moved in opposite directions. 
Justice O'Connor's dissent seems motivated by her belief that 
the ordinance challenged in that case prevented a dangerous use 
of a floodplain: the operation of a camp for disabled children.148 
Both the briefs that were filed in First English and the oral 
arguments that were made before the Court demonstrate the 
advocates' understanding that the most effective way to obtain a 
Justice's vote is to use one of the crosscutting issues as leverage 
to support his or her view of the merits of the regulatory takings 
claim. Those supporting a damages remedy, then, stressed to 
Justice O'Connor the abusive and unfair tactics employed by 
land-use regulators.149 In contrast, those resisting a damages 
remedy sought to persuade conservative Justices like Justice 
O'Connor by repeatedly emphasizing the intrusiveness of damag-
es remedies on state and local governments and the propriety of 
judicial deference to legislative judgments.1so . 
Accordingly, the Court's regulatory takings precedent is not 
simply the product of a debate on the meaning of private proper-
ty and its relationship to the police power. The votes of individu-
al Justices are often as much the result of their views on other 
crosscutting jurisprudential concerns implicated by the regulato-
148. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text. 
149. See First English Oral Argument Transcript, supra note 97, at 58 (statement of 
Michael Berger, Counsel for First English) ("[Governmental delays and lengthy litiga-
tion in regulatory takings casesJ is the kind of horror story, Justice O'Connor, that 
goes on in California, and it goes on all the time."). The property owner's efforts seem 
to have had an impact on Justice O'Connor, which, despite her dissent in First Eng-
lish, may explain her aggressive stance in favor of property owners in subsequent 
regulatory takings cases. See id. at 55 (statement of Justice O'Connor) ("[TJhere are 
some horror stories out there of local governments intentionally running these things 
through the mill indefinitely ... with full recognition that if they lose on one they 
can make a minor modification of the requirement and go again and effectively de-
prive people forever of any use."); supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
150. Environmental organizations resisting the damages remedy sought to invoke 
the federalism and judicial activism concerns of conservative Justices. See, e.g., Brief 
of the National Trust for Historic Preservation, National Association of Counties, 
National Association of County Planning Directors, National Wildlife Federation, 
Preservation Action, and National Parks and Conservation Association, As Amici Cu-
riae in Support of Appellees at 13, San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 
450 U.S. 621 (1981) (No. 79-678) ("Implying a [dJamage [rJemedy [wJould [iJnterfere 
with the [rJelationship [bJetween [tlederal and [sJtate [aJuthorities and [bJetween the 
[cJourts and the [l)egislative [bJranch"). 
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ry takings debate. They may have inclinations regarding private 
property and its relative importance, but for most Justices, those 
inclinations are not the driving force behind their answers to the 
legal questions presented. Each Justice looks beyond that nar-
row debate and seeks to develop a position that responds to his 
or her view on issues such as original intent, federalism, judicial 
activism, the need for judicially manageable standards, and oth-
er similar concerns, in the ultimate effort to define their own 
jurisprudential identity. For that reason, scholars and practitio-
ners seeking to proffer a workable test for regulatory takings 
analysis are mistaken if they focus on the property rights issue 
in isolation. In order to establish a stable majority view on the 
Court, one must make a careful accounting of a variety of cross-
cutting issues that underlie the shifting coalitions behind the 
Court's discordant rulings to date. The question of how some 
Justices on the current Court might seek to accomplish that task 
and what such a test might look like is the subject of this 
Essay's final lesson. 
III. LESSON NUMBER THREE: THE SIGNS OF A JUSTICE 
KENNEDY-LED MAJORITY ON THE COURT FOR A NEW 
REGULATORY TAKINGS TEST 
Piercing the Supreme_Court's veil promotes understanding of 
the Court's regulatory takings precedenf, including both the cur-
rent vulnerability of rulings like Lucas and the identity of those 
factors that have produced the thin and shifting majorities sup-
porting the Court's decisions. Such piercing also provides guid-
ance regarding what a new majority led by Justice Kennedy 
might decide in future regulatory takings cases. The seemingly 
aberrant votes of individual Justices suggest where common 
ground is likely to be found between otherwise opposing views. 
These votes are not necessarily the product of illogic or inconsis-
tency; they instead may reflect potential accommodation and the 
seeds of future compromise between what long have remained 
opposing, irreconcilable views. 
Notwithstanding the inevitably speculative nature of the exer-
cise, predicting where that compromise might be struck is possi-
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ble. This is not to suggest what the Court should dO.151 This 
prediction, instead, involves the far more problematic undertak-
ing of gauging where the Court's regulatory takings analysis is 
likely to go should Justice Kennedy attempt to forge a new ma-
jority on the issue. Make no mistake about it-this is an exer-
cise in unabashed speculation. 
Drawing on the analysis presented in the prior two sections of 
this Essay, the general ingredients of a new, centrist majority 
led by Justice Kennedy would seem to be (1) Justice Kennedy's 
concurring opinion in Lucas,152 (2) Justice O'Connor's concern 
with state and local autonomy and ,~he need to restrict activities 
dangerous to human life and health,153 (3) Justice Stevens's 
concern with singling out property owners for disproportionate 
burdens and perhaps with historic preservation laws general-
ly/54 (4) Justice Stevens's further concern with permanent 
physical occupation of private property,155 (5) former-Justice 
Brennan's concern (likely shared by the more liberal members of 
the current Court) with government abuse of police power au-
thority at the expense of individual autonomy and security,156 
(6) former-Justice White's related concern with the sanctity of 
the home,157 (7) Justice Souter's concern with the limits of tak-
ings analysis and the propriety of the judicial role in overseeing 
state and local land-use planning,158 and (8) Justice Breyer's 
views on the impropriety of presuming constitutional codification 
of a particular economic theory and the necessity of allowing for 
police power restrictions protective of human health and 
151. For criticism of the "fundamental rights" framework emerging in the Court's 
regulatory takings cases, see Rubenfeld, supra note 6, at 1097-11. 
152. 505 U.S. 1003, 1032 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
153. See supra notes 94·97 and accompanying text. 
154. See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text. 
155. See supra notes 86·89 and accompanying text. 
156. See supra notes 81, 138 and accompanying text. 
157. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
158. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 411·14 (1994) (Souter, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing that the Court is improperly addressing issues not raised by the facts 
before the Court); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1076·78 
(1992) (statement of Souter, J.) (voting to dismiss the writ of certiorari); cf. United 
States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1651·52 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing for 
deference to the legislature). 
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s afety. 159 
Because Justice Kennedy is the most likely instigator of a new 
majority, his concurring opinion in Lucas provides the logical 
starting point for developing a new framework. That opinion 
certainly presents the possibility of a middle-ground position. In 
his Lucas opinion, Justice Kennedy challenged both sides of the 
regulatory takings debate and took a few tentative steps toward 
bridging their differences. 
First, Justice Kennedy challenged the two mainstay positions 
of the Lucas majority. He contended that total economic depriva-
tion was not enough to justify a per se approach.160 He further 
argued that, in any event, the common law of nuisance and oth-
er background principles of the common law do not provide the 
exclusive justification for denying just compensation for such a 
complete deprivation of property rightS.161 
Justice Kennedy offered in place of the Lucas majority's ana-
lytic framework one requiring an independent assessment of the 
loss of value in light of the landowner's reasonable expecta-
tions.162 This inquiry would include consideration of the prop-
erty owner's actual intent as well as his capacity to undertake 
the use, the prevention of which now forms the basis of his tak-
ings claim.l63 Justice Kennedy also argued that mere back-
ground principles of the conimon law were insufficient to define 
a property owner's reasonable expectations. He argued instead 
that such interests could find a basis in "objective rules and 
customs that can be understood as reasonable by all parties in-
159. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text. 
160. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) 
("Where a taking is alleged from regulations which deprive the property of all value, 
the test must be whether the deprivation is contrary to reasonable, investment-
backed expectations."). 
161. See id. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing Goldblatt v. 
Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 593 (1962» ("In my view, reasonable expectations 
must be understood in light of the whole of our legal tradition. The common law of 
nuisance is too narrow a confine for the exercise of regulatory power in a complex 
and interdependent society."). 
162. See id. at 1034 (Kennedy" J., concurring in the judgment). 
163. See id. at 1033 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Among the matters 
to be considered on remand must be whether petitioner had the intent and capacity 
to develop the property and failed to do so in the interim period because the State 
prevented him."). 
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volved. "164 
According to Justice Kennedy, these objective rules and cus-
toms extend to the government's "enacting new regulatory initia-
tives in response to changing conditions .... "165 In justifying 
restrictions beyond the common law, he offered as an example 
the government's need to restrict private uses on a "fragile land 
system" like coastal property, even if such restrictions might 
result in the complete destruction of economic value.166 Such 
restrictions, in Justice Kennedy's view, would not interfere with 
the reasonable expectations of an owner of ecologically fragile 
property. 
Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Lucas also challenged those 
who favor governmental regulation. He suggested that not all 
governmental ends would be sufficiently weighty to warrant de-
nying compensation. He identified promotion of tourism as a 
governmental goal that would not justify the absence of compen-
sation.167 Additionally, Justice Kennedy introduced a new di-
mension to takings analysis by asserting that the regulatory 
means as well as the ends must be reasonable in order to pass 
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause muster.16S 
A possible analytical framework that emerges from Justice 
Kennedy's views is not unlike that which the Court utilizes in 
other areas of constitutional law. Takings scrutiny would essen-
tially have two different levels, in much the same way that the 
Court applies different levels of scrutiny to decide equal protec-
tion/69 First Amendment,170 and dormant Commerce Clause 
challenges. 171 
164. [d. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
165. [d. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
166. [d. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
167. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
168. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
169. See Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996) (applying strict scrutiny review to a 
state's redistricting plan); Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996) (applying strict 
scrutiny review to a state's redistricting plan); Romer v. Evans, 1l.6 S. Ct. 1620 
(1996) (applying rational basis review to Colorado's "Amendment 2"). 
170. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1519 (1995) (apply-
ing strict scrutiny to political speech); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 
507 U.S. 410, 417 n.13 (1993) (applying intermediate scrutiny to commercial speech); 
Larsen v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982) (applying strict scrutiny to cases involv-
ing religious freedom). 
171. See Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 98-
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There would, in the first instance, be an inquiry into the al-
leged deprivation in order to gauge its relative severity based on 
its character and degree. This first-level inquiry would deter-
mine whether the takings issue at hand implicated a "core" or 
"fundamental" concern of the Just Compensation Clause. Wheth-
er the landowner's deprivation warranted just compensation 
would turn on that inquiry in combinatiQn with an inquiry into 
the substantiality of the government's justification for the chal-
lenged restriction, based similarly on the character of the justifi-
cation and the degree to which the restriction is reasonably nec-
essary to serve that justification. The injection of the "necessary" 
qualifier reflects Justice Kennedy's stated concern with the rea-
sonableness of the "means" as well as the "ends" of the chal-
lenged restriction. 
Core concerns would trigger, in effect, heightened takings 
scrutiny. Just compensation would not be required per se, but 
the government would have to survive heightened scrutiny to 
avoid the compensation requirement. The test would make dif-
ferences in kind dispositive and would turn on differences in 
degree only when they reached the level of gross 
disproportionality. The inquiries would remain fairly binary: 
akin to heightened takings scrutiny for some kinds of interfer-
ences and diminished scrutiny for lesser interests. The courts 
have utilized such approaches more or less successfully in a host 
of other constitutional contexts, albeit with a tendency to create 
compromising categories of mid-level scrutiny.172 Such blunt-
edged approaches cause difficulties at the borders173 but are 
worthwhile so long as the categories provide for easy disposition 
of the vast majority of cases. 
The challenge, of course, would be to identify the categories: 
99 (1994) (explaining which level of scrutiny to apply in negative Commerce Clause 
cases); Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454 (1992) (finding protectionist state 
statutes per se invalid under the Commerce Clause). 
172. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2375-76 (1995) (de-
scribing "intermediate" level scrutiny for restrictions on commercial speech); J.E.B. v. 
Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 135 (1994) (describing "heightened equal protec-
tion scrutiny" review of gender-based classifications). 
173. See, e.g., Discouery Network, 507 U.S. at 419 ("This very case illustrates the 
difficulty of drawing bright lines that will clearly cabin commercial speech in a dis-
tinct category."). 
HeinOnline -- 38 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1136 1996-1997
1136 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1099 
(1) the kinds of interferences with private property that would 
warrant the greatest degree of protection and (2) the kinds of 
governmental interests, if any, capable of justifying the most 
intrusive restrictions without compensation. At one end of the 
spectrum would be total destruction of economic value, which 
generally would warrant heightened judicial scrutiny. Defining 
the center of the spectrum is more difficult, however, and Jus-
tice Kennedy's Lucas concurrence suggests where to draw some 
of the finer distinctions. Any economic deprivation under a tak-
ings claim must be based on actual rather than theoretical con-
templated use, and the actual use must be clearly lawful at the 
time that the property owner's expectations came into fru-
ition.174 Otherwise, the expectations are not sufficiently reason-
able to warrant heightened constitutional protection. In addi-
tion, owners of fragile land systems would generally be on notice 
that the government might need to enact substantial restrictions 
on the use of the property to guard against the possible adverse 
consequences of developing such land. 175 
Justice Kennedy's concurrence also suggests that promotion of 
tourism, business, and other economic redistributive goals would 
not be legislative ends capable of satisfying heightened takings 
scrutiny. Hence, just compensation would be required in instanc-
es of total destruction of economic value.176 Although such con-
cerns are entirely legitimate and important bases for police pow-
er restrictions on the use ofland, the Court's new majority likely 
would conclude that it is proper to assign them less weight in 
the takings equation than they would a police power measure 
intended to prevent serious public health and safety risks. In the 
former circumstances, the police power measure is exclusively 
distributional in character. Depriving one property owner of all 
economic value for the benefit of another competing economic 
value normally would require just compensation.177 
174. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1033 (1992) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
175. See id. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
176. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
177. Somewhat analogous concerns have been expressed in the Court's dormant 
Commerce Clause cases. See Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 
956 (1982) (recognizing the difference between economic protectionism and health 
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On the other hand, as Justice Kennedy maintained in Lucas, 
government regulations aimed at stabilizing especially fragile 
land systems could satisfy the heightened takings review.178 
The reasons for the governmental restriction may have 
distributional or aesthetic dimensions, but they are not exclusive-
ly so. The basic maintenance of those land systems typically can 
serve even weightier and more substantial ends because of the 
degree and kind of harms that result from their disruption.179 
The prior votes and opinions of other likely members of a Jus-
tice Kennedy majority further fill out this new takings 
framework.1SO Permanent physical invasions or occupations 
would plainly trigger heightened takings scrutiny. 181 So too 
would interferences with property rights that implicate core pri-
vate property concerns with personal autonomy and security. 182 
One example would be governmental prohibition of a 
landowner's construction of a single-family home for her person-
al use. Another might be governmental engagement in continu-
ous, proximate overflight of private residential property.l83 
Governmental prohibitions on traditional rights and uses of 
property, such as basic subsistence activity or the right to de-
vise, also would likely merit heightened takings scrutiny.l84 
Restrictions on the use of property in order to promote historic 
preservation would satisfy normal takings review but would be 
less likely to survive heightened takings scrutiny as applied by a 
Justice Kennedy-led majority. ISS Restrictions that would pass 
and safety regulations). 
178. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
179. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the.judgment). 
180. See Laura S. Underkufller-Freund, Takings and the Nature of Property, 9 CA-
NADIAN J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 161, 185 (1996) (describing how under emerging Su-
preme Court precedent "all property interests are. not held with the same intensity 
and are not protected equally" and how there is a "hierarchical ordering of stringen-
cy of protection"). 
181. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015. 
182. See supra notes 81, 136 and accompanying text. 
183. See Brown v. United States, 73 F.3d 1100 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
184. See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987). 
185. Even the United States as amicus curiae in support of the City of New York 
in Penn Central agreed that the historic landmark designation would amount to a 
taking if the property owner was not provided a "reasonable return." Penn Central 
Oral Argument Transcript, supra note 144, at 59. The federal governntent's argu-
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muster under heightened analysis, on the other hand, would in-
clude those that safeguard human health and safety/86 as long 
as they are reasonably necessary. AB proposed by Justice Kenne-
dy in Lucas, this inquiry would focus on the reasonableness of 
the means.187 A court would consider whether the restrictions 
were reasonably or narrowly tailored, including the reasonable-
ness of the fit between the government's purposes and the object 
of the restriction. The government would need to demonstrate a 
cause-and-effect relationship between the property use re-
stricted by the regulation and the social evil that the regula-
tion seeks to remedy. [So long as] the owner's use of the prop-
erty is (or, but for the regulation, would be) the source of the 
social problem, it cannot be said that he has been singled out 
unfairly. 188 
An inquiry into the reasonableness of the means likely would 
not require a distinct less restrictive alternative analysis, but 
that issue will probably be a matter of considerable discussion in 
the fashioning of this new approach. In other areas of constitu-
tional law, the Court has embraced such a heightened inquiry 
into means without subjecting the restriction to less restrictive 
alternative scrutiny.189 To satisfy this standard, a restriction 
ment in that case was presented by then-Assistant Attorney General Patricia Wald, 
now a federal appellate judge. 
186. Like Justice O'Connor in First English, see supra note 97, Justice Kennedy in 
Lucas repeatedly posed questions at oral argument suggesting that there are in-
stances when all economic uses can be taken for urgent safety reasons and not com-
pensated, citing earthquake faults and coastal property as two examples. See Official 
Transcript Proceedings Before the Supreme Court of the United States at 15-16, 
Lucas (No. 91-453). The identity of Justice Kennedy is not evident on the face of the 
transcript; his identity is derived from the author's notes taken at the oral argument 
itself (notes on file with the author). 
187. See supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
188. Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 20 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). The Court's ruling in Pennell is especially significant in 
discerning possible compromise because Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, 
Blackmun, and Stevens all joined the Chief Justice's majority opinion. See id. at 3. 
Justices Scalia and O'Connor joined only in part, and Justice Kennedy did not par-
ticipate in the case. See id. at 20. 
189. The Court currently uses this approach in the First Amendment area to deter-
mine the validity of government regulation of commercial speech. See Florida Bar v. 
Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2380 (1995) (quoting Board of Trustees v. Fox, 
492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989» ("[TJhe 'least restrictive means' test has no role in the 
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must not be unduly over- or underinclusive. An example of im-
permissible underinclusiveness could be a restriction that sin-
gles out one property owner for severe use restrictions but 
leaves other, similarly situated properties unrestricted. "A regu-
lation need not be 'absolutely the least severe that will achieve 
the desired end,' but if there are numerous and obvious less-bur-
densome alternatives to the restriction . . . that is certainly a 
relevant consideration in determining whether the 'fit' between 
ends and means is reasonable. "190 Where the fit is deemed un-
reasonable, compensation would be required. 
In many respects, of course, Justice Scalia already is trying to 
lead the Court to a takings analysis with his own binary frame-
work. The substance of that analysis, however, would be very 
different. Under his view, the per se takings catego-
ries-physical occupation and total economic depriva-
tionl91-undoubtedly would be much larger, and the takings 
test for those intrusions falling outside the per se categories 
would be significantly more demanding. 
Justice Brennan's "rule of five," however, likely prevented 
Justice Scalia from going as far as he would have preferred to go 
in Lucas. He was unable to answer the crucial denominator 
question raised by the Lucas framework: "[How to] make clear 
the 'property interest' against which the loss of value is to be 
measured. "192 If the economic impact inquiry is based on "par-
cel as a whole" analysis,193 compensation will rarely be justi-
commercial speech context. 'What our decisions require,' instead, 'is a "fit" between 
the legislature's ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends,' a fit that is 
not necessarily perfect, but reasonable .•.. "); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Net-
work, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 416 (1993) (quoting Fox, 492 U.S. at 480) ("It [is] the city's 
burden to establish a 'reasonable fit' between its legitimate interests in safety and 
esthetics and its choice of a limited and selective prohibition of newsracks as the 
means chosen to serve those interests."). 
190. DiscolJery Network, 507 U.S. at 417 n.13 (quoting Fox, 492 U.S. at 480). 
191. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015-16 (1992). 
192. [d. at 1016 n.7. Justice Scalia, writing for the Court in Lucas, explicitly recog-
nized the significance of the denominator issue. See id. ("Regrettably, the rhetOrical 
force of our 'deprivation of all economically feasible use' rule is greater than its pre-
cision, since the rule does not make clear the 'property interest' against which the 
loss of value is to be measured."). 
193. See id. at 1016-17 n.7; Keystone Bituminous Coal ABs'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 
U.S. 470, 496-99 (1987) (applying "parcel as a whole" analysis); Penn Cent. Transp. 
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fied-invariably some part of the property will possess residual 
economic value. If the inquiry is based on a denominator that 
considers just the most restricted part of the property, however, 
compensation will be ordered far more routinely. Justice Scalia 
no doubt would have liked to address that issue, but, in doing 
so, he probably would have lost Justice White's vote and perhaps 
Justice O'Connor's vote as well. 
Justice Kennedy, however, appears interested in leading the 
Court down a quite different path. His willingness to do so in 
future cases will turn on the strength of his conviction that Jus-
tice Scalia's position is ill-advised and not susceptible to mere 
fine-tuning. Even if willing, Justice Kennedy's ability to create 
the new majority will also turn on the willingness of some of the 
more liberal Justices to temper their own views to achieve a 
more centrist position. 
CONCLUSION 
Wishful thinking of others notwithstanding, the "takings puz-
zle" has not been solved.194 In certain respects, the pieces of 
that puzzle are in as much disarray as ever. The Lucas majority 
view does not solve the puzzle;195 that decision is not even like-
ly to be weighty precedent before the current Court. 
The most likely solution to the puzzle will not come from Jus-
tice Scalia, even though he has written many of the Court's most 
recent significant regulatory takings opinions. It will more likely 
come from Justice Kennedy, who has written no opinions for the 
Court on the issue. The signs of a Justice Kennedy-inspired new 
majority are already evident. They present themselves both in 
his surprising concurring opinion in Lucas as well as in a careful 
parsing of those various votes of the other Justices that likewise 
seemed initially surprising or even anomalous. Together, they 
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978) ("'Taking[sl' jurisprudence does 
not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether 
rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated. . . . [TJhis Court focus-
es rather both on the character of the action and on the nature and extent of the 
interference with rights in the parcel as a whole .... "). 
194. But see Douglas W. Kmiec, At Last, the Supreme Court Solves the Takings 
Puzzle, 19 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POLY 147 (1995). 
195. But see id. at 148, 151-52. 
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present the possibility a of new comproIIllse. The willingness 
and ability of those JustIces to forge that comprOIIllse remams 
an open questIon. So, too, does the unpact of JustIce Brennan's 
unrelentIng "rule of five" when change in the Court's member-
s1np next occurS.196 
196. The two most likely Justices to retire next-Cmef Justice Rehllqulst and Jus-
tice Stevens (with Justice O'Connor as an outside possibility}-would shift; the 
Court's voting m very different directions. 
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